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Abstract Albeit a pervasive desideratum when computing in the presence of
selfish agents, truthfulness typically imposes severe limitations to what can be
implemented. The price of these limitations is typically paid either economically, in
terms of the financial resources needed to enforce truthfulness, or algorithmically,
in terms of restricting the set of implementable objective functions, which often
leads to renouncing optimality and resorting to approximate allocations. In this
paper, with regards to utilitarian problems, we ask two fundamental questions: (i)
what is the minimum sufficient budget needed by optimal truthful mechanisms,
and (ii) whether it is possible to sacrifice optimality in order to achieve truthfulness
with a lower budget. To answer these questions, we connect two streams of work
on mechanism design and look at monitoring – a paradigm wherein agents’ actual
costs are bound to their declarations. In this setting, we prove that the social cost
is always a sufficient budget, even for collusion-resistant mechanisms, and, under
mild conditions, also a necessary budget for a large class of utilitarian problems
that encompass set system problems. Furthermore, for two well-studied problems
outside of this class, namely facility location and obnoxious facility location, we
draw a novel picture about the relationship between (additive) approximation and
frugality. While for optimal mechanisms we prove that the social cost is always a
sufficient and necessary budget for both problems, for approximate mechanisms we
do have a dichotomy: for the facility location problem (i.e., agents want to be close
to the facilities) we show that “good” approximations still need a budget equal to
the social cost; on the contrary, for the obnoxious facility location problem (i.e.
agents want to be as far away from the facilities as possible) we show that it is
possible to trade approximation for frugality, thus obtaining truthfulness with a
lower budget.
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1 Introduction
Truthful (also termed strategyproof ) mechanisms represent the principal tool to
compute in the presence of selfish agents. They guarantee that the objectives
of the designer (e.g., minimize a certain global function) are aligned with the
agents’ individual objectives. This compatibility to the incentives, however, often
requires extravagantly large monetary transfers from the mechanism to the agents.
Consider, e.g., the problem of buying a path on a given graph whose n edges are
owned by selfish agents. This is an instance of a utilitarian problem – a problem
wherein each agent incurs a cost to implement the mechanism’s outcome and the
designer wants to minimize the sum of individual agents’ costs. In this case, while
truthfulness can be easily guaranteed by using Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG), the
amount of money needed to achieve incentive-compatibility can be as large as n
times the cost of the second cheapest path. The truthfulness guarantee then loses
some of its appeal, as it cannot be ensured when the budget of the designer is not
big enough [39].
This motivates the definition of budget-feasible mechanisms [47], wherein, to-
gether with truthfulness, we require that the total amount of payments is within
a given budget. The literature on this notion (cf., e.g., [16,7,13,30,2,25,3,11])
mainly looks at procurement auctions, in which sellers (bidders) have private costs
to produce items, and the buyer (auctioneer) aims at maximizing a social valuation
function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment.
Alas, this setting is quite different from the path auction setting (and, more gener-
ally, from any utilitarian problem) in that the designer’s objective does not depend
on the agents’ declarations. The literature on frugality of truthful mechanisms for
utilitarian problems, on the other hand, proves that the overpayment of VCG is not
accidental: any truthful mechanism for path auctions must overpay by as much
[19]. Further research proves that similar results hold true for other utilitarian
problems, including minimum spanning trees, set systems and matroids [48,28].
Therefore, generally speaking, the budget might be as high as the total payments
of VCG, making truthfulness too expensive to afford for a mechanism designer on
a budget.
A related strand of work, which considers the weaker solution concept of Nash
equilibria instead of dominant strategies, studies subsidies to selfish agents as
a means of enforcing efficient equilibria in non-cooperative games. For instance,
subsidies in price competition games among single product vendors are studied in
[10]. In [8] a cost sharing system is studied where users purchase public services
equally sharing their cost, and a central authority enforces “good” purchasing
choices by reinvesting tax revenue in the form of subsidies to the public services.
In [5] Augustine et al. study network design games where a set of agents share
the cost of building edges on a network, and subsidies (partially) cover the cost of
some of the edges included in the equilibrium spanning tree. Augustine et al. prove
that to enforce a particular spanning tree as a Nash equilibrium it is sufficient and
necessary to subsidize a constant fraction of the cost of the minimum spanning
tree.
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In this work we pursue two main desiderata: firstly, we want to make truthful-
ness less expensive to obtain, and, secondly, we want to characterize the payments
– and hence the budget needed – for any utilitarian problem. As from the discus-
sion above, making truthfulness less expensive requires us to depart from classical
mechanism design; it turns out that our choice of alternative mechanism design
paradigm goes some way towards the latter objective (i.e., obtaining a character-
ization of frugal payments). In detail, we look at mechanisms with monitoring,
studied in [32,33,23]. 1 Mechanisms with monitoring assume that the designer is
able to monitor the agents’ costs so to guarantee that the agents who have exag-
gerated theirs end up paying the reported (higher) cost. Intuitively, it is assumed
that the designer can ‘watch’ the agents at “work” and force them to spend more
than their real cost, if they overbid. The designer, however, neither punishes agents
who underbid their cost nor imposes any extra fines to overbidding agents. For
example, let us consider again the path auction setting where each edge weight
represents its latency time. If an agent overbids her cost, then the designer can
detect that, as the observed latency time will be lower than the reported one (un-
less the agent waits and “simulates” the reported cost – note that in doing so
the agent will effectively pay her reported cost). In this scenario, it is possible to
design a mechanism with monitoring as the designer can easily enforce this higher
cost by, e.g., charging the difference to the agents or keeping them idle for the
time difference.
1.1 Our contribution
We begin by observing that, irrespectively of the algorithm of interest, paying an
agent her declared cost is sufficient to guarantee collusion-resistant mechanisms
with monitoring, i.e., the strongest form of incentive-compatibility, resistant to
collusive behavior and side payments. This result has three important implica-
tions. Firstly, for mechanisms with monitoring, the authors of [33] prove that any
algorithm admits payments leading to truthful mechanisms with monitoring when
agents bid from finite domains (i.e., the possible cost functions they can declare
to the mechanism belong to a finite set). Our result extends theirs in that: (i)
we do not make any assumption on the bidding domain and (ii) we significantly
strengthen the incentive-compatibility guarantee to obtain resistance to collusive
behavior and side payments. The second consequence concerns the related re-
search agenda in mechanisms with verification [39,41]. The notion defined in [39]
is more restrictive than monitoring since underbidding is punished. We show that
the compensation and bonus mechanism in [39] is unnecessarily complex: simple
compensation without punishments guarantees both truthfulness and collusion-
resistance. Lastly, we show that the social cost (i.e., sum of the agents’ costs) is a
sufficient budget for any (not necessarily utilitarian) problem.
1 The terminology is introduced in [33] while [32,23] study the same model under the mis-
nomer of mechanisms with verification. In the verification model of [39] it is effectively assumed
that the designer can monitoring overbidding and punish underbidding; in [41] (and related
literature) instead the designer only punishes underbidding but does not monitor overbidding
– the difference between the models is furthermore studied therein. We here only monitor
overbidding as in [32,33,23].
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Discounting the payments for a cheaper budget. We subsequently investigate the
extent to which the social cost is a necessary budget. To do so, we relax voluntary
participation and study the feasibility of diminishing our payment function via
discounts (for the designer) while maintaining incentive-compatibility and non-
negative payments (clearly, we do not want to charge agents, for otherwise any
budget would be feasible). There are many real-life scenarios where voluntary
participation is not satisfied and agents are somehow ‘forced’ to play (e.g., abiding
by a law that increases one’s own cost).
We assume that the discounts are bid-independent functions; e.g., the dis-
count applied to the payment to player i does not depend on her bid bi. While
in the classical setting this assumption is without loss of generality, for mecha-
nisms with monitoring it excludes some possible payment schemes. For example,
the payment function in [33] can be seen as a first-price payment discounted by a
bid-dependent function. However, we make two important observations on more
general bid-dependent discounts. Firstly, we show that bid-dependent discounts
do restrict the class of algorithms that can be used by incentive-compatible mech-
anisms. Having bid-independent discounts is then necessary to keep the focus on
algorithms as general as possible. Furthermore, studying budget feasibility in gen-
eral would require an algorithmic characterization of truthful mechanisms with
monitoring in order to relate the quality of the algorithmic solution to the sum of
the payments needed. Understanding how truthfulness depends upon the individ-
ual bid-dependent discounts is an open problem that requires the development of
novel techniques, as all the known ones only deal with bid-independent payments.
An initial study for a specific discount is done in [21]. We however give some indi-
cation that bid-dependent discounts are not much cheaper than bid-independent
discounts, and prove how a particular subclass of the former is actually not cheaper
at all.
Can we trade money for approximation? Under the assumption of bid-indepen-
dent discounts, we first show the necessity of the social cost as a budget for the large
class of set system problems (which include, essentially, all problems on graphs
such as path auctions, shortest path trees, minimum spanning trees, etc.). We
then focus on two well-known variants of the facility location problem, namely the
K-facility location and the obnoxious 1-facility location. We want to determine
the location of some facilities (K desirable facilities and one obnoxious facility,
respectively) on the real line on input the locations of n agents, with the objective
of minimizing the social cost. In the K-facility location problem, facilities provide
some desirable service to the agents, who then want to be as close as possible
to them: the social cost is defined as the sum of the individual agents’ distances
between their location and the nearest facility. In the obnoxious 1-facility location
problem, the facility causes some discomfort to the agents (e.g., it is a landfill site),
hence they want to be as far away from it as possible: the social cost is defined as
the sum of individual agents’ costs that are non-increasing functions with respect
to the distance between their location and that of the facility.
The motivation to study the budget for this paradigmatic problem in algorith-
mic mechanism design is twofold: (i) it has a combinatorial structure significantly
different from the aforementioned set system problems that requires an ad hoc
analysis; and (ii) the state of the art on the problem suggests that money ought
to be used to obtain both truthfulness and good approximations [22,20].
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For K-facility location, we provide a number of results proving the necessity
of the social cost as a budget, depending on the algorithm of interest. Arguably,
the most interesting contribution relates (additive) approximation guarantee with
frugality and answers the question of whether truthful implementations of approx-
imate solutions might be cheaper than that of the optimum. We prove that there
is no such tradeoff as long as “good” approximations are concerned. For obnoxious
1-facility location, we show that the social cost is a necessary budget for optimal
mechanisms, but, contrarily to the facility location problem, we show that money
and (additive) approximation guarantee can be traded for one another: a designer
can here in fact know how good a solution they can truthfully implement given
their available budget, or, alternatively, how much they can save on their budget
if they are willing to accept a certain degree of approximation.
Roadmap. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
discuss some related work. In Section 3 we give some formal definitions. Section 4
shows that the social cost is a sufficient budget for collusion-resistant mechanisms
with monitoring (Corollary 1) and identifies some properties for this to be also
a necessary budget for any algorithm (Theorem 2). Subsequent sections study
these properties for a number of optimization problems studied in the literature,
namely: set systems (Section 5), K-facility location (Section 6) and obnoxious
facility location (Section 7).
2 Related Work
We here discuss some previous works related to facility location, obnoxious facility
location and set system.
2.1 Set systems
Talwar [48] analyzes the overpayment the VCG mechanism incurs to enforce truth-
fulness in k-set cover problems, where, given a universe E and a collection of sets
{S1, . . . , Sm}, each having a cost c(Si) and |Si| ≤ k, the problem consists in find-
ing a minimum cost cover whose union equals E. Talwar shows that the payment
of the VCG mechanism is at most k · c(OPT ′), where OPT ′ is the cost of the best
cover disjoint from the optimum cover OPT. For the same k-set cover problem as
[48], Calinescu [9] proposes two approximate truthful mechanisms whose payments
are bounded by (k−1)·c(OPT )+k·c(OPT ′). Furthermore, he shows that the same
two approximation algorithms have payments bounded by k ·(c(OPT )+c(OPT ′))
when applied to more general set systems, which include k-polymatroid cover (a
problem related to Steiner Tree computations). The total payments of these al-
gorithms are bounded by q · k2 times the total payment of the VCG mechanism,
where q is such that an element in a k-set cover instance appears in at most q sets.
To address those scenarios where the concept of frugality ratio given in [48]
is not well defined, Karlin et al. [28] define a new notion of frugality ratio for
procurement auctions. In particular, they compare the payments of a truthful
auction to the minimum payments of a first-price auction (i.e., each bidder is
paid their bid) at a Nash equilibrium of the game (since first-price auctions are
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not truthful and hence have no dominant strategies). Under this new definition of
frugality ratio, they generalize results from [48] and prove that VCG mechanisms
have frugality ratio 1 for auctions on set systems if and only if the feasible sets of
the set system are the basis of a monopoly-free matroid. Furthermore, they develop
truthful mechanisms with constant frugality ratio for r-out-of-k set systems2 and
path auction problems.
Elkind et al. [18] propose a novel truthful polynomial-time auction for the
vertex cover problem and bound its frugality ratio. In particular, they show both
(i) that the solution quality of a truthful auction is within a constant factor of the
optimum, and (ii) that its frugality ratio is within a constant factor of the best
possible worst-case bound. Notably, this is the first auction for this problem to
have these properties. Furthermore, they show how any truthful auction can be
transformed into a frugal one while preserving the approximation ratio. They also
consider two natural modifications of the definition of frugality ratio given in [28],
and analyze the properties of the resulting payment bounds.
Kempe et al. [29] study truthful frugal mechanisms for vertex cover auctions, k-
flow auctions (i.e., the auctioneer wants to purchase k edge-disjoint s-t paths), and
cut auctions (i.e., the auctioneer wants to purchase an s-t cut) and present truthful
mechanisms with constant frugality ratios for all three set systems problems, i.e.,
the maximum overpayment of the mechanism is within a constant factor of the
maximum overpayment of any truthful mechanism, for every set system in the
class. In particular, for vertex cover they propose a mechanism based on scaling
each bid by a multiplier derived from the dominant eigenvector of a certain matrix,
whereas the mechanism for k-flows prunes the graph to be minimally (k + 1)-
connected, and then applies the vertex cover mechanism. The mechanism for cut
auctions contracts the graph until all s-t paths have length exactly 2, and then
applies the vertex cover mechanism.
Chen et al. [12] devise a uniform scheme for designing frugal truthful mecha-
nisms for general set systems based on scaling the agents bids using the eigenvector
of a matrix that encodes the interdependencies between the agents. They show how
the r-out-of-k-system mechanism and the mechanism for buying a path in a graph
presented in [28] can be viewed as instantiations of this scheme. Furthermore,
they apply their scheme to vertex cover systems and k-path systems, bounding
the frugality of the mechanism in terms of the largest eigenvalue of the respective
interdependency matrix.
Hajiaghayi et al. [26] introduce a new benchmark for measuring the frugality
ratio of an auction and show two attractive properties lacking in the previous
proposals, namely: monotonicity and smoothness. Based on this benchmark, they
provide positive results for vertex cover and knapsack auctions. In particular, for
vertex cover auctions they prove that the mechanism proposed in [29] is optimal up
to a constant factor, whereas for knapsack auctions they give a truthful mechanism
with an almost-tight bounded frugality ratio.
2 A set system (E,F) is an r-out-of-k-system if there exists a partition of E into k disjoint
sets S1, . . . , Sk, such that every set F ∈ F contains exactly r out of these k sets of elements.
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2.2 Facility Location
The facility location problem has proved to be a fertile research problem in many
research communities. In his classical paper ([38]) Moulin characterizes the class of
generalized median voter schemes as the only deterministic truthful mechanisms
for single-peaked agents on the line. Schummer and Vohra [43] extend the result of
Moulin to the more general setting where continuous graphs are considered, char-
acterizing truthful mechanisms on continuous lines and trees. They show that on
circular graphs every truthful mechanism must be dictatorial. Procaccia and Ten-
nenholtz [42] initiated the field of approximate mechanism design without money
by suggesting the idea of leveraging approximation to obtain strategyproofness in
all those scenarios where (i) the optimal allocation is not truthful and (ii) it is
not possible to resort to monetary transfers. For the 2-facility location problem,
they propose an (n− 2)-approximate truthful mechanism, where n is the number
of agents. Furthermore, they provide a lower bound of 3/2 on the approximation
ratio of any truthful algorithm for the facility location problem on the line and con-
jecture a lower bound of Ω(n). The latter conjecture was later proven by Fotakis et
al. [22] by providing a characterization of deterministic truthful mechanisms with
bounded approximation ratio for the 2-facility location problem on the line. Lu et
al. [36], improve several bounds studied in [42]. Particularly, as regards determin-
istic algorithms they prove a better (with respect to [42]) lower bound of 2−O( 1n ).
Furthermore, they prove a 1.045 lower bound for randomized mechanisms for the
2-facility location problem on the line and present a randomized n/2-approximate
mechanism. In [35], Lu et al. focus on general metric spaces for 2-facility games.
They prove an Ω(n) lower bound for the approximation of deterministic strate-
gyproof mechanisms and propose a randomized algorithm that achieves constant
approximation ratio. Alon et al. [1] derive a linear (in the number of agents) lower
bound for truthful mechanisms on continuous cycles and a constant approximation
bound for randomized mechanisms in the same settings. Dokow et al [17] study
facility location problems on discrete lines and cycles. They prove that, in this
setting, truthful mechanisms are nearly-dictatorial in that all agents can effect the
outcome to a certain extent. Contrarily to the case of continuous cycles studied in
[43], for small discrete graphs Dokow et al. prove that there are anonymous truth-
ful mechanisms. Furthermore, they prove a linear lower bound in the number of
agents for the approximation ratio of truthful mechanisms on discrete cycles. Facil-
ity location for discrete graphs and heterogeneous facilities (i.e., serving different
purposes) has been studied [44–46] also in presence of heterogeneous preferences
[49,4,34] where agents can either like or dislike the facilities.
Ferraioli et al. [20] focus on identifying a set of verification assumption that
yield good approximation guarantees for (homogenous) K-facility location prob-
lems on the line. In particular they identify sets of cost-based and topological
verification assumptions that guarantee truthfulness of the optimal mechanisms
for both the social cost (for a generic K and max cost (for K = 2) objective func-
tions, showing that these sets of assumptions are minimal in the sense that relaxing
any assumption in the set breaks truthfulness. Furthermore, they conjecture that
these verification assumptions are necessary not only to achieve truthfulness with
optimal algorithms, but also for any constant-approximation (or even sublinear-
approximation) algorithm.
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2.3 Obnoxious Facility Location
Cheng et al. [15] are the first to study the obnoxious facility location problem from
a mechanism design without money perspective. They prove a 3-approximation
group-strategyproof deterministic mechanism, which is the best possible if the
only two candidates are the endpoints of the path, and a group-strategyproof ran-
domized mechanism with tight approximation ratio of 32 . For circles and trees they
propose 3-approximation group-strategyproof deterministic mechanisms and, for
unrestricted networks, a 4-approximation group-strategyproof deterministic mech-
anism and a 2-approximation group-strategyproof randomized mechanism. Ibara
and Nagamochi [27] prove that if there are more than two candidates (i.e. loca-
tions output by the mechanism for some reported locations), there are no truthful
mechanisms without money in the linear metric. Furthermore, they characterize
group-strategyproofness for mechanisms with exactly two candidates in the general
metric and show that there always exists a 4-approximation group-strategyproof
mechanism in any metric.
In [48], Talwar gives an upper bound for the total payments in a facility location
game, but his setting is quite different to the one we explore in this paper, as agents
control the facilities and connection costs are publicly known.
3 Preliminaries
We have a set of outcomes O and n selfish agents. Each selfish agent has a cost
function, also called type ti : O → R≥0. For x ∈ O, ti(x) is the cost paid by
agent i to implement x. The type ti is private knowledge of agent i. The set of
all admissible cost functions ti is called the domain of agent i and is denoted Di.
Assuming that each agent has (truthfully or otherwise) reported, or bid, a cost
function bi ∈ Di, a mechanism determines an allocation x ∈ O. Furthermore,
depending the different bi, it will determine payments p = (p1, . . . , pn) to be given
to the agents. In summary, by letting D =×ni=1Di, a mechanism is a pair (f, p)
that, on input the agents’ costs functions, uses algorithm f : D → O to return an
outcome in O and function p : D → Rn≥0 to determine payments to be awarded to
each agent i.
For mechanism (f, p) and a bid vector b, we let u
(f,p)
i (b) denote the utility of
agent i for the output computed by (f, p) on input b. To ease the notation we drop
(f, p) when this is clear from the context. Since the types ti are private knowledge
of the agents, they might find it profitable to bid bi 6= ti. We are interested in
mechanisms for which truthtelling is a dominant strategy for each agent.
Definition 1 A mechanism (f, p) is truthful if for any i, any bids b−i of the
agents other than i, and any bi ∈ Di, ui(ti,b−i) ≥ ui(bi,b−i).
Collusion resistance is a stronger requirement that demands truthtelling be a
dominant strategy for coalitions of agents that can exchange side payments among
themselves.
Definition 2 A mechanism (f, p) is collusion-resistant if for any C ⊆ [n] any bids
b−C ∈×i6∈C Di and any bC ∈×i∈C Di,
∑
i∈C ui(tC ,b−C) ≥
∑
i∈C ui(bC ,b−C),
tC denoting the vector (ti)i∈C .
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A mechanism (f, p) satisfies Voluntary Participation (VP) if ui(ti,b−i) ≥ 0 for
all agents i, ti ∈ Di and b−i ∈×j 6=iDj . We also say that a mechanism is budget-
feasible (with respect to budget B) if, for any b ∈ D,
∑n
i=1 pi(b) ≤ B. Observe
that budget-feasibility makes sense when payments are non-negative (as from our
model above) as any mechanism charging agents would be budget-feasible (with
respect to budget 0). This property on the sign of the payments is sometimes
known in literature as No Positive Transfer (NPT).
In the literature, ui is usually defined as a linear combination of the payment
and the agent’s true cost. In mechanisms with monitoring, this quasi-linear def-
inition is maintained but costs paid by the agents for the allocated resource are
more strictly tied to their declarations. Intuitively, it is assumed that the designer
can ‘watch’ the agents at “work” and force them to spend more than their real
cost, if they overbid. Note that the designer neither punishes agents who underbid
their cost nor imposes any extra fines to overbidding agents. In this sense, such
a notion is much less restrictive than the concept of mechanisms with verification
studied, e.g., in [39,41]. In a mechanism with monitoring (f, p), we have
u
(f,p)
i (bi,b−i) := pi(b)−max{ti(f(b)), bi(f(b))}.
It is important to stress that the designer does not observe the agents’ private
information but only checks that agents are not more economical (e.g., faster)
than declared. Agents can pretend to have a higher cost (e.g., processing time) at
the expense of being “busy” that long. Agents can still underbid and at execution
time have a higher cost (e.g., saying to have underestimated their cost or work).
There are many applicative scenarios in which this can be implemented. In the
context of facility location, one might think of facilities as meeting/conference
places, and of costs as travel expenses to reach the facilities. When agents’ costs
are reimbursed, receipts must be presented. For the agents to be consistent with
overbidding they need to pay the exaggerated (reported) cost. Receipts are then
a “monitoring” tool.
For an instance b of a utilitarian cost-minimization problem Π, we focus on
algorithms f∗ optimizing the social cost, i.e., f∗(b) ∈ arg minx∈O cost(x,b),
where cost(x,b) =
∑n
i=1 bi(x). We say that algorithm f for a utilitarian cost-
minimization problem Π is (additively) α-approximate if, for every b, it returns a
solution whose cost is at most cost(f∗(b),b) + α.
We argue that adopting additive approximation instead of the classical notion
of multiplicative approximation is better suited to our goals. Indeed, our aim here
is not merely to optimize the approximation, but rather that of identifying a tool
that allows us to relate the budget with the quality of solutions. As we will prove
later on, in our setting the additive approximation term is more appropriate to
serve this purpose, as it immediately tells us the amount of extra payments (prior
to the discounts, if any) needed for implementation. Interestingly, [24] also argues
the merits of additive approximation for facility location.
4 Bounding the budget
For an algorithm f , define pi(b) = bi(f(b)) and call (f, p) a first-price mechanism.
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Theorem 1 For any f , the first-price mechanism (f, p) is a collusion-resistant
mechanism with monitoring.
Proof. Fix C and b−C . Let t be a shorthand for the bid vector (tC ,b−C) and,






















bi(f(b))−max{ti(f(b)), bi(f(b))} ≤ 0.
This concludes the proof.
We can then conclude that the social cost is a sufficient budget.
Corollary 1 Let Π be a (utilitarian) cost-minimization problem. There exists a
collusion-resistant budget-feasible first-price mechanism (f, p) with monitoring and
budget B if for any instance b of Π, cost(f(b),b) ≤ B.
4.1 When is the social cost necessary?
The minimum budget needed for a budget-feasible first-price mechanism using f
for problem Π is B∗ = maxb∈D cost(f(b),b). Is it possible to maintain incentive-
compatibility with a budget smaller than B∗? A first observation is that, if we want
our mechanisms to satisfy voluntary participation, then B∗ is the smallest budget
possible. However, in some applications, it is reasonable to adopt mechanisms that
do not satisfy this property and therefore it makes sense to consider the necessity
of B∗ for those mechanisms. For instance, drawing a parallel with the setting where
subsidies are employed to enforce efficient equilibria, [8,5,10], relaxing voluntary
participation is equivalent to providing partial subsidies that do not cover the
whole cost of the equilibrium solution. We pursue this research direction in the
remainder of the paper.
4.1.1 Payment structure
It is easy to see that the incentive-compatibility of first-price mechanisms is pre-
served if
pi(b) = bi(f(b)) + hi for collusion-resistance (1)
pi(b) = bi(f(b)) + hi(b−i) for truthfulness (2)
This is an if and only if for classical mechanisms (see, for instance, [40, The-
orem 9.37]) in that payments of truthful mechanisms are unique up to bidder-
dependent discounts that depend only on the declarations of the other bidders.
We call the mechanisms that use the payment functions above (bid-independent)
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discounted first-price mechanisms. Since we want both to save on the payments of
a first-price mechanism and to have non-negative payments, we have that for all i
and b:
−bi(f(b)) ≤ hi, hi(b−i) ≤ 0. 3 (3)
We can then prove the following result.
Theorem 2 ( i) If for all i there exists a bid vector b such that bi(f(b)) = 0 then
there is no collusion-resistant discounted first-price budget-feasible mechanism with
monitoring using f and whose budget is smaller than B∗.
( ii) If for all i and b−i there exists bi such that bi(f(b)) = 0 then there is no
truthful discounted first-price budget-feasible mechanism with monitoring using f
and whose budget is smaller than B∗.
Proof. (i) Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a collusion-
resistant discounted first-price budget-feasible mechanism with monitoring f such









must exist an î such that hî < 0. Let b̄ be the vector such that b̄î(f(b̄)) = 0. We
have that hî < −b̄î(f(b̄)), which violates (3).
(ii) Let us assume by contradiction that there exists a truthful discounted first-
price budget-feasible mechanism with monitoring f such that for all i and for









∗ holds, there must exist an î such that hî(b
∗
−i) < 0.
Let b̄î be such that b̄î(f(b̄î,b
∗






The theorem above gives us a condition for the necessity of B∗ for discounted
first-price mechanisms. Whenever there is no bi and b−i such that bi(f(b)) = 0,
we do have a discount in terms of payments. It is not hard to see that to maximize
this discount, and reduce the budget of a truthful discounted first-price mechanism




4.1.2 The limits of more general discounts
We justify the focus of Theorem 2 on payment functions (1) and (2) by showing
the limitations of more general payment functions, such as,
pi(b) = bi(f(b)) + hi(b)
that we call fully discounted with respect to (hi)i, and the very special case
pi(b) = bi(f(b)) + hi(bi)
3 One might wonder whether relaxing the upper bound for some agents, and allowing a
surplus for them, would allow to save more on the remaining agents. Our results of necessity
cover also this case since they prove that no single agent can have a negative discount.
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termed single-bid discounted. Similar to the case of discounted first price mecha-
nisms, we observe that the following inequality must hold for all i and all b:
−bi(f(b)) ≤ hi(bi), hi(b) ≤ 0. (5)
General discounts (might) destroy truthfulness
Theorem 2 is as general as it can be without restricting the class of algorithms it
applies to. We show, in fact, that fully discounted payments restrict the class of
algorithms that can be used by truthful mechanisms.
An algorithm f is said monotone with respect to hi if bi(f(b)) > b
′
i(f(b))
implies hi(bi,b−i) > hi(b
′
i,b−i) for some b−i and b
′
i 6= bi. It is then not too hard
to prove:
Proposition 1 An algorithm f monotone with respect to hi is not truthful with
monitoring when coupled with a payment function that is fully discounted with
respect to (hj)j.
Proof. Let b−i be the vector for which f is monotone with respect to hi. Consider
a bi ∈ Di and define agent i’s true type to be ti 6= bi, ti ∈ Di such that bi(f(b)) ≥
ti(f(b)) (such a ti always exists as long as the domain is sufficiently rich). Then,
agent i is better off declaring bi when f is coupled with a fully discounted pay-
ment function. In fact, ui(ti,b−i) = hi(ti,b−i) and ui(bi,b−i) = hi(bi,b−i). By
monotonicity of f , we have hi(bi,b−i) > hi(ti,b−i).
Money is needed
The observation here directly follows from the results in [33]. The authors prove
that mechanisms with monitoring without money have very limited power in the
context of truthful allocation of RAM to selfish jobs. Specifically there is no truth-
ful mechanism with monitoring without money with bounded approximation ratio.
This implies that, in general, money needs to be used (i.e., hi(b) > −bi(f(b)))
and then savings, if any, are somewhat limited. Furthermore, this suggests that
the trade-off between approximation and frugality is strongly unbalanced.
Single-bid discounts are as bad as bid-independent discounts
The following result, similar in nature to Theorem 2, gives us a condition for the
necessity of B∗ for single-bid discounted mechanisms.
Theorem 3 If for all i and for all bi there exists b−i such that bi(f(b)) = 0, then
there is no truthful single-bid discounted first price mechanism with monitoring
using f and whose budget is smaller than B∗.
Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that there exists a truthful single-bid dis-
counted budget-feasible mechanism with monitoring f such that for all i and for all
bi there exists b−i such that bi(f(b)) = 0, and still maxb∈D
∑n
i=1(pi(b)+hi(bi)) <
B∗. Let b∗ ∈ argmaxb∈Dcost(f(b),b). Since
∑n
i=1(pi(b
∗) + hi(bi)) < B
∗, there
must exist an î such that hî(b
∗
î













, b̄−î)), which violates (5).
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In the following sections we will also briefly discuss the application of single-
bid discounts to set systems, facility location and obnoxious facility location. This
serves the purpose of justifying our emphasis on bid-independent4 discounts. In-
deed, we show that more general discount functions such as single-bid discounts
do not exhibit superior performances in terms of budget savings, whereas fully
discounted payment functions (as we have already shown) may even impose re-
strictions on the set of possible algorithms.
5 Set systems
In a set system (E,F) we are given a set E of elements and a family F ⊆ 2E
of feasible subsets of E. A set system is upward closed if for every S ∈ F and
every superset T , with S ⊂ T ⊆ E, we have T ∈ F . Each element e ∈ E is
associated with a non-negative cost function c : E → R≥0; for S ⊆ E, we let
c(S) =
∑
e∈S c(e). The goal is to find a feasible subset of minimum total cost.
For these problems, we can then assume without loss of generality that (E,F) is
upward closed and therefore that it is fully defined by the minimal sets (bases)
in F , defined as B = {S ∈ F : no proper subset of S is in F}. As noted above,
several problems such as minimum spanning tree, shortest path (tree), etc. can be
cast in this framework. To map this setting with the general mechanism design
setting above, we have that O = B and the set of agents is E – in this context, for
bidder i, we let ti = t(i) denote i’s true type and bi = b(i) a generic bid in Di. In
particular, we here have
ti(S) =
{
ti if i ∈ S
0 otherwise
i.e., an element that does not belong to a set has no cost to “implement” that set.
For example, an agent controlling an edge that does not belong to the minimum
spanning tree computed by the mechanism has no cost, since she will not be part
of the output. The extent to which monitoring can be implemented for this class
of problems is discussed above in the introduction.
Theorem 4 Let f∗ be an optimal algorithm for a set system. For all i and b−i
there exists bi such that bi(f
∗(b)) = 0.
Proof. Fix i and b−i. Consider f
∗(b−i) ∈ O and let C−i = c(f∗(b−i)). Let S
be the set in O including i with minimum cost and let Ci=0 =
∑
e∈S,e 6=i be. If
C−i < Ci=0 then no matter bi, i 6∈ f∗(b) and bi(f∗(b)) = 0. If C−i ≥ Ci=0
then by setting bi = 0, no matter whether i is in f
∗(b) or not, we have that
bi(f
∗(b)) = 0 .
By Theorem 2, we have the following result.
Corollary 2 There exists no optimal truthful discounted first-price budget-feasible
mechanism with monitoring for set systems using a budget that is smaller than
maxb∈D cost(f(b),b).
4 For the sake of brevity, unless otherwise stated, in the remainder we will always refer to bid-
independent discounted first-price mechanisms simply as discounted first-price mechanisms,
whereas we will explicitly write single-bid discounted first-price mechanisms to refer to payment
functions that employ single-bid discounts.
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We now investigate single-bid discounts and prove that they perform as bad
as bid-independent discounts.
Proposition 2 There exists no optimal truthful single-bid discounted first-price
budget-feasible mechanism with monitoring for set systems using a budget that is
smaller than B∗.
Proof. By Theorem 3, to prove the claim we need to show that for all i and for
all bi there exists b−i such that bi(f
∗(b)) = 0 Let bi = δ > 0 (for otherwise
bi(f
∗(b)) = 0 regardless of f∗(b)). Without loss of generality, we can assume
that there is a feasible solution S such that i /∈ S (the set system is monopoly-
free), for otherwise we can exclude i from the instance since no matter what she
declares she is going to be selected (note that incentive-compatibility and the
budget are not affected in our setting with monitoring). Let bj =
δ−ε
|S| for each
j 6= i, for some δ > ε > 0 arbitrarily small. But then we have that i /∈ f∗(b) since
δ − ε = c(S) < δ ≤ c(S′) for any feasible S′ such that i ∈ S′.
6 K-facility location
In K-facility location (or simply facility location) the set of feasible solutions
is comprised of all the K-tuples of possible allocations of the facilities, whilst
the domain of each agent is the real line. For a given algorithm f and ti ∈ Di,
ti(f(ti,b−i)) = |ti − fti(ti,b−i)|, where fti(ti,b−i) denotes the location of the
facility output by f(ti,b−i) closer to location ti. In other words, ti(f(ti,b−i))
denotes the distance between ti and the location of fti(ti,b−i).
The following theorem proves that VCG mechanisms charge the agents rather
than paying them in this setting.
Theorem 5 VCG payments for facility location are always non-positive.
Proof. The VCG payment for agent i is defined as pi(b) = cost(f
∗(b−i),b−i) −
cost(f∗(b),b−i), where f
∗ is an optimal algorithm. The thesis follows by observing
that cost(f∗(b−i),b−i) ≤ cost(f∗(b),b−i) by optimality.
The fact that the VCG payments are always non-positive makes VCG a non-
viable option for many real life incarnations of facility location, and motivates the
study of monitoring in this setting. To give an example of such a scenario, consider
a crowdsourcing data mining problem where we want to cluster/classify5 a set of
agents for market-segmentation purposes. The agents might lie in order to obtain
a classification/clustering that more closely matches their own true labels/cluster
membership, thereby creating a bias in the data. In this case we cannot assume that
the agents will pay to take part to our market analysis study. For another example,
consider a scenario similar to the one in [8] where the payments are interpreted as
subsidies taken by the general taxation and paid by the government in order to
support the adoption of environmentally sustainable public transportation systems
(the facilities to be used by the agents) in a given urban area. Clearly, the subsidies
here are meant to be a positive payment from the mechanism to the agents and not
5 See [37] for the similarities among facility location and clustering/classification with strate-
gic data sources.
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vice versa. Finally, let us note that we can implement monitoring in this context
whenever evidences of the cost can be provided (and cannot be counterfeited)
– e.g., distance is measured in miles/time and/or receipts are needed for cost
reimbursement, as from the discussion above.
6.1 Optimal mechanisms
We next prove that the social cost is a necessary budget for optimal mechanisms.
Lemma 1 For all i, and b−i, if bi ∈ f∗(b−i) then
cost(f∗(bi,b−i), (bi,b−i)) = cost(f
∗(b−i),b−i)
Proof. Let us first assume that:
cost(f∗(bi,b−i), (bi,b−i)) < cost(f
∗(b−i),b−i). (6)
Then, the following holds:
cost(f∗(bi,b−i),b−i) ≤ cost(f∗(bi,b−i), (bi,b−i))
which combined with (6), yields:
cost(f∗(bi,b−i),b−i) < cost(f
∗(b−i),b−i)
thus contradicting the optimality of f∗. We observe that
cost(f∗(bi,b−i), (bi,b−i)) > cost(f
∗(b−i),b−i)
does not hold either, as otherwise f∗(b−i) would be a better solution for (bi,b−i)
than f∗(bi,b−i). Indeed, cost(f




Theorem 6 Let f∗ be an optimal algorithm for K-facility location. Then for all
i and b−i there exists bi such that bi(f
∗(b)) = 0.
Proof. Fix i and b−i and let y = {y1, . . . , yK} = f∗(b−i) be the optimal al-
location for bid vector b−i. We set bi = yj for a generic j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. We
need to prove that bi ∈ f∗(bi,b−i), from which the theorem follows, since in
this case bi(f
∗(bi,b−i)) = 0. For the sake of contradiction, let us suppose that
bi /∈ f∗(bi,b−i), which implies that bi(f∗(bi,b−i)) > 0. Then f∗(bi,b−i) is a
better allocation for b−i than f
∗(b−i), which contradicts the optimality of f
∗.
Indeed, the following holds: cost(f∗(bi,b−i),b−i) < cost(f
∗(bi,b−i), (bi,b−i)) =
cost(f∗(b−i),b−i) where the inequality holds because bi(f
∗(b)) > 0 by hypothe-
sis, and the equality follows from Lemma 1.6
By Theorem 2 we have the following result.
Corollary 3 There is no optimal truthful discounted first-price budget-feasible
mechanism with monitoring for facility location whose budget is smaller than B∗.
6 A simpler proof works when agents have unrestricted domains (i.e., simply set bi big
enough with respect to b−i so to force f∗ to locate one facility on bi). Our argument applies
also to more restricted settings as considered in, e.g., [6].
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6.2 Collusion-resistant mechanisms
An algorithm f is simple, if f(b) ⊆ b, i.e. the facilities are allocated only at
agents’ locations. Observe that the focus on simple algorithms is without loss of
generality from the approximation guarantee point of view. Moreover, as already
discussed in [20], this is the most natural class of (deterministic) algorithms for
the problem. An algorithm is anonymous if its output does not change if agents
swap declarations. Formally, let π : [n] → [n] be a permutation of the agents and
let bπ be the declaration vector b where entries are permuted according to π; f
is anonymous if f(b) = f(bπ).
Theorem 7 Let f be a simple and anonymous algorithm for facility location.
Then for all i there exists b such that bi(f(b)) = 0.
Proof. In order to prove the claim, we need to prove that ∀i, ∃b−i ∃bi such that
bi(f(b)) = 0, for all simple anonymous mechanisms f . Since f is simple, for all
b there exists an agent j such that bj(f(b)) = 0. For all i 6= j we construct
bπ from b where we swap the declarations of agent i and agent j: bπi = bj ,
bπj = bi and b
π
` = b` ∀` /∈ {i, j}. Since f is anonymous, f(b) = f(bπ) and
bπi (f(b
π)) = bj(f(b)) = 0.
By Theorem 2 we have the following result.
Corollary 4 There is no collusion-resistant discounted first-price budget-feasible
mechanism with monitoring for facility location that utilizes a simple and anony-
mous algorithm f whose budget is smaller than B∗
6.3 Trading approximation for frugality
Given an optimal algorithm f∗, we define f∗ε as the algorithm that shifts
7 by ε the
location of the facilities returned by f∗. Formally, let f∗ε (b) = (Fj + ε)j=1,...,K ,
where (F1, . . . , FK) denotes the output of f
∗(b). We ask whether, by moving the
allocation from f∗ to f∗ε , the cost paid in terms of approximation guarantee can
be compensated by a lower budget.
It is well known that the optimal solution for an instance b partitions the agents
into {S1, . . . , SK} so that all i ∈ Sj are served by Fj , defined as a median of Sj . Our
analysis assumes that ε is “small enough”; this intuitively means that the optimal
partitions of f∗(b) do not change when agents’ locations and the locations of the
facilities shift by ε. Formally, let bε`,k = (bk + ε,b−`) for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
In words, in bε`,k we set the location of agent ` to bk + ε (i.e., ε to the right
of the location of some other agent k). Let {Sε1 , . . . , SεK} and {S
ε,`,k
1 , . . . , S
ε,`,k
K }





7 We justify our focus on f∗ε by highlighting how useful a tool it is to study the tradeoff
between frugality and approximation in this setting, as it allows us to both: (i) easily predict the
location of the facility; and (ii) compute the approximation ratio achievable given the particular
configuration of the instance at hand (see Theorem 8). If we were to focus, for instance, on the
class of mechanisms having a given approximation guarantee, we would certainly retain (ii)
but we would have to restrict ourselves to specific algorithms within this class to also retain
(i).
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respectively. We say that ε is “small enough” if, for all `, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the
following conditions hold: (i) Sj = S
ε
j for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and (ii) Sj = Sε,`,kj
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
The following partition of the agents of a given instance is useful.
Definition 3 Let (F1, . . . , Fk) denote the output of f
∗ on input b. For all 1 ≤
j ≤ K, we partition the agents in the following sets:
– ∆j1 = {i|bi ∈ (max∆
j−1

















where, for notational convenience, we set max`∈∆03 b` = −∞ and min`∈∆K+11 b` =





Informally, ∆j1 denotes all the agents that are located to the left of Fj but to
the right of the rightmost agent in ∆j−13 , ∆
j
2 denotes the agents that are located
between Fj and Fj + ε (inclusive) and ∆
j
3 denotes the agents that are located to
the right of Fj + ε but to the left of the leftmost agent in ∆
j+1
1 .
We now prove the approximation guarantee of algorithm f∗ε .
Theorem 8 If ε is small enough, then f∗ε (b) is ((δ1 + δ2)ε)-approximate. More
specifically, we have (δ1 + δ2)ε > cost(f
∗
ε (b),b)− cost(f∗(b),b) ≥ (δ1− δ2− δ3)ε.
Proof. Fix b and j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. We first observe that, since ε is small enough
for the allocation f∗ε (b), the agents in ∆
j
1 have to pay the same cost they paid for
f∗(b) plus ε. For the lower bound to cost(f∗ε (b),b)− cost(f∗(b),b), we similarly




3 can save (at most) ε
on their cost to implement f∗(b). (That is, the agents in ∆j3 save exactly ε whilst
those in ∆j2 can save less than that.) For the upper bound, instead, we note that
agents in ∆j2 might need to pay at most ε more in f
∗
ε (b) than in f
∗(b) (when
their location is very close to Fj); in the worst case, the agents in ∆
j
3 will pay
exactly as much in f∗ε (b) as in f
∗(b) (when their location is very close to Fj + ε).
By summing up on all j, we prove the claim.
We next show that, in this context, there cannot be a tradeoff between ap-
proximation quality and frugality of mechanisms. We begin by establishing a
useful property of certain optimal algorithms. We let f∗ be the optimal algo-
rithm for facility location that uses a fixed tie-breaking rule, i.e., for every pair of
bid vectors b,b′, if both cost(f∗(b),b) = cost(f∗(b′),b) and cost(f∗(b′),b′) =
cost(f∗(b),b′) hold, then f∗(b) = f∗(b′). It is easy to check that an optimal
algorithm with fixed tie-breaking always exists. For example, the rule that chooses
the lexicographically minimal allocation among all optimal allocations satisfies the
property above.
Lemma 2 Let f∗ be an optimal algorithm for facility location that uses a fixed
tie-breaking rule. Then for all i, all b−i and all bi such that bi ∈ f∗(b−i), the
following holds: f∗(bi,b−i) = f
∗(b−i) .
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Proof. Let us fix i and b−i and consider the output of f






by which, we get f∗(b−i) = f
∗(b) because of the fixed-tie breaking rule. Indeed,
for (7) we have that
cost(f∗(b−i),b−i) ≤ cost(f∗(b),b−i) ≤ cost(f∗(b),b)
where the first inequality follows from optimality of f∗(b−i) and the second in-
equality follows from non-negativity of costs.
Equation (7) then follows since cost(f∗(b−i),b−i) = cost(f
∗(b),b) by Lemma
1. Equation (8) holds by Lemma 1, because cost(f∗(b−i),b−i) = cost(f
∗(b),b)
and bi(f
∗(b−i)) = 0 by definition.
We are now ready to state and prove the following.
Theorem 9 Let f∗ be an optimal algorithm for K-facility location that returns the
lexicographically minimal (or maximal) allocation among all optimal allocations.
For ε small enough, let f∗ε be defined as above upon f
∗. If n > 2K, then for all i
and b−i there exists bi such that bi(f
∗
ε (b)) = 0.
Proof. We start from a vector b and use f∗(b) to prove that for all agents i there
exists a b′i ∈ Di such that b′i(f∗ε (b′i,b−i)) = 0.
Fix i and let S be the member of the partition of agents induced by f∗(b)
to which i belongs. We let F denote the median of S and, with a slight abuse of
notation, ∆1, ∆2 and ∆3 be the partitions of the agents in S as from Definition
3.
We begin by considering the case that |S| > 1 is odd. In this case, the optimal
location is F = bk for some agent k. If i ∈ ∆2 ∪ ∆3, then both F and F + ε do
not change as long as agent i declares a location that does not change the optimal
partition and is to the right of F . Hence, since ε is small enough, the claim is
proved for b′i = F + ε. Let us now consider the case when i ∈ ∆1. Let k denote the
median agent of S (breaking ties by lexicographic order if there is more than one
agent at the median location) and let ` be the leftmost agent such that F ≤ b`
and ` 6= k. If i declares b′i = b` + ε, then since ε is small enough, we have F = b`
and the claim is proved.
We now consider the case that |S| > 2 is even. In this case, S has two medians;
we denote their locations as a and b, with a ≤ b, respectively. Note that, by
hypothesis, f∗ returns either a or b (in general, all the locations in [a, b] are optimal
for S). An argument similar to the case when |S| > 1 and |S| is odd holds in this
case, and we omit it for the sake of brevity. Finally, we now deal with |S| ≤ 2. In
this case, we look at the biggest partition Sj output of f
∗(b−i) and set b
′
i = Fj . As





≥ 2. Moreover, since f∗ uses a fixed tie-breaking
rule (as noted above, returning lexicographically minimal/maximal solutions is a
particular fixed-tie breaking rule) we can conclude by Lemma 2 that f∗(b−i) =
f∗(b′i,b−i). Hence, the partition Sj will have now one more agent than before.
But then putting things together we note that i belongs to a set of the partition
induced by f∗(b′i,b−i) with at least 3 agents. We can then apply recursively on
(b′i,b−i) the arguments above.
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By Theorem 2 we have the following result.
Corollary 5 There is no truthful discounted first-price budget-feasible mechanism
with monitoring for facility location, that uses f∗ε defined upon an optimal algo-
rithm that returns lexicographically minimal (or maximal) optimal allocation whose




We now investigate single-bid discounts and prove that they perform as bad as
bid-independent discounts.
Proposition 3 There is no truthful single-bid discounted first price mechanism
for the facility location problem that uses a budget lower than B∗ and has bounded
multiplicative approximation ratio.
Proof. Any algorithm f with bounded multiplicative approximation ratio satisfies
Theorem 3, i.e., for all i and for all bi there exists b−i such that bi(f(b)) = 0.
Indeed, given i and bi, we construct an instance where all agents are located at
bi, i.e., bj = bi,∀j. Note that the optimum algorithm allocates at least one facility
at bi, hence bi(f(b)) = 0. Furthermore, since the optimal allocation has a cost
of 0, all allocations such that bi(f(b)) > 0 (i.e., allocate no facilities at bi) have
unbounded approximation ratio.
Proposition 4 There is no truthful single-bid discounted first-price budget-
feasible mechanism with monitoring for facility location that uses f∗ε whose budget
is smaller than maxb∈D cost(f
∗
ε (b),b).
Proof. By Theorem 3, we need to prove that for all i and for all bi there exists a
b−i such that bi(f
∗
ε (b)) = 0. We assume that n ≥ 2K+1. Given bi, construct b−i
as follows. We define K groups of bn−1K c bidders, such that each group is located
at bi − j · ε, for j = 1, . . . ,K. Each of the remaining q = n− 1−K · bn−1K c agents
(if any) is located to bi − j · ε, for j = 1, . . . , q. Now it is easy to check that the
optimal algorithm locates the K facilities at bi − j · ε for j = 1, . . . ,K, while f∗ε
will locate one facility at bi, hence bi(f
∗
ε (b)) = 0.
7 Obnoxious Facility Location
In the obnoxious facility location problem we have to locate one obnoxious facility
on a fixed interval in such a way as to minimize the social cost incurred by the
agents. The set of feasible solutions is the set of points in the interval, namely
O = {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x ≤ `}, where ` denotes the length of the interval.8 For a given
algorithm f and ti ∈ Di, ti(f(ti,b−i)) = ` − |ti − f(ti,b−i)|. It is well known





i=1(`− ti) then the facility is allocated at 0, otherwise
it is allocated at `.
8 We note that unless the length of the interval is specified, the problem is not well-defined,
as a solution with lower social cost can always be obtained by moving the facility farther away.
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Just like for facility location, VCG payments would charge the agents (it is
easy to check that Theorem 5 holds for obnoxious facility location as well), and an
analog argument suggests that VCG payments are unsuitable in some scenarios
where we cannot assume that agents will have to pay to participate in the game.
We then study the budget of truthful discounted first-price mechanisms with
monitoring and show that the social cost is a necessary budget for the optimal
mechanism.
Theorem 10 Let f∗ be an optimal algorithm for the obnoxious facility location
problem. For all i and for all b−i there exists bi such that bi(f
∗(b)) = 0.
Proof. Let us consider a generic b−i and let us assume first that
∑
j 6=i bj >∑
j 6=i(` − bj). If this is the case, then f
∗(b−i) = 0. If we choose bi = `, it is




j=1(` − bj) still holds and hence f
∗(b) = 0. In
this case, bi(f(b)) = 0. A similar argument holds if
∑
j 6=i bj <
∑
j 6=i(` − bj) and
f∗(b−i) = `. The remaining case to consider is
∑
j 6=i bj =
∑
j 6=i(`− bj). This can
only occur when b−i is symmetric with respect to
`
2 . However, irrespective of the




j=1(`− bj) and hence
f∗(b) = 0, implying bi(f(b)) = 0.
By Theorem 2 we have the following result.
Corollary 6 There is no truthful discounted first-price budget-feasible mechanism
with monitoring for obnoxious facility location, that uses an optimal algorithm f∗,
whose budget is smaller than B∗
7.1 Trading approximation for frugality
Given an optimal algorithm f∗, we define f∗ε as the algorithm that shifts by ε the
location of the facility returned by f∗. In particular, if f∗(b) = 0 then f∗ε (b) = ε,
whereas if f∗(b) = ` then f∗ε (b) = ` − ε. Unlike the case of facility location, the
shift of the facility operated by f∗ε is not unidirectional: this is to prevent the
facility from being allocated outside of the interval. We next prove that for f∗ε
savings are possible.




Proof. It is easy to see that bi(f
∗
ε (b)) = 0 only if |bi − f∗ε (b)| = `, which is the
case only when the facility is located at one extreme of the interval and bi is at
the other extreme. For ε > 0, this case can never occur, as f∗ε (b) /∈ {0, `}.
Definition 4 Let f∗ = f∗(b) and f∗ε = f
∗
ε (b). We define the following partition
of agents: ∆+ = {i | bi(f∗ε ) > bi(f∗)}, δ+ = |∆+|; ∆− = {i | bi(f∗ε ) < bi(f∗)},
δ− = |∆−|; and ∆= = {i | bi(f∗ε ) = bi(f∗)}, δ= = |∆=|.
Put in words, ∆+, ∆− and ∆= denote the set of agents whose cost with respect
to the allocation f∗ε has, respectively, increased, decreased or stayed the same when
compared with the optimal allocation f∗. Of course, δ+ + δ− + δ= = n holds.
Lemma 3 proves that f∗ε is ((δ
+ − δ−) · ε)-approximate; however, as proved in
Theorem 12, this loss in approximation can be recovered by the budget savings
possible.























Fig. 1 Approximation vs Frugality for Obnoxious Facility
Lemma 3 Let f∗ be an optimal allocation algorithm that always locates the facility
at one extreme of the interval9 and let f∗ε be the shifted allocation function defined
upon f∗. It holds: cost(f∗ε (b),b) = cost(f
∗(b),b) + (δ+ − δ−) · ε.
Proof. By definition, the only agents whose cost varies when the facility is allo-
cated according to f∗ε instead of f
∗ are those in ∆+ and ∆−. In particular, their
cost changes of exactly ε with respect to the cost they incur when the facility
is allocated optimally. The following equality follows from the simple observation
above: cost(f∗ε (b),b) = cost(f
∗(b),b) + (δ+ − δ−) · ε.
Theorem 12 For 0 < ε < `2 , algorithm f
∗
ε achieves a budget saving of ε(n+δ
−−
δ+) with respect to f∗. For `2 < ε < ` algorithm f
∗
ε achieves a budget saving of
n`− (n+ δ− − δ+)ε with respect to f∗.




orem 11 and Lemma 3, the budget needed to implement f∗ε is cost(f
∗(b),b) +
(δ+ − δ−)ε+ n · hi(b−i) where hi(b−i) is defined in (4).
For 0 < ε ≤ `2 , hi(b−i) = −ε. This yields a budget saving of (n + δ
− − δ+)ε.
We observe that the saving is always non-negative (e.g., the budget required to
implement f∗ε is never higher than the one required to implement f
∗) since n ≥ δ+.
For `2 < ε < `, hi(b−i) = ε−`. This yields a budget saving of n`−(n+δ
−−δ+)ε.
We observe that the saving in this case can be negative (e.g., the budget required
to implement f∗ε can be higher than the one required to implement f
∗) depending
on the value of ε and on the structural configuration of the instance at hand.
Theorem 12 provides a way to compute the budget needed to implement a
solution with a desired level of approximation (with respect to the optimal solu-
tion) or, put otherwise, to estimate in advance the quality of service (in terms of
9 Note that we are assuming a fixed tie-breaking rule when there are multiple optimal
allocations (i.e., n is even and n/2 agents are at 0 and n/2 agents at `). We assume that the
algorithm will allocate consistently the facility at one extreme of the interval.
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approximation) we can afford given a set budget. To illustrate this, Figure 1 refers
to an instance b of obnoxious facility location where n2 + 1 agents reside at 0 and
n
2 − 1 agents reside at `. The horizontal and vertical axes represent, respectively,
the shift ε controlling the approximation, and the monetary cost of implementing
the solution. The optimal solution for this instance is to allocate the facility at `,
at a cost (n2 − 1)`, which is above the budget B and cannot be implemented. To
find out the level of efficiency εB we can afford, we just need to find the leftmost
intersection between the budget line B and the cost of implementing f∗ε , denoted∑
i pi(f
∗














`+ (δ+ − δ− − n)ε if 0 < ε ≤ `2
−n+22 `+ (δ
+ − δ− + n)ε if `2 < ε < `




ε ) is piece-wise linear, where the various segments
originate both from ε ranging over (0, `) as the location of the facility is shifted,
and from the change of δ+, δ= and δ−, that, in turn modifies the slope of the line
segments. In this particular case, the sets ∆+,∆− and ∆= do not change since the
agents reside at 0 and `. We note that, consistently with Figure 1, for ε ∈ (0, `2 ]
the slope of the curve (δ+ − δ− − n) is always negative, whereas for ε ∈ ( `2 , `)
the slope of the curve (δ+ − δ− + n) is always positive. The efficiency loss we
incur in implementing f∗εB (b) can be computed analytically as cost(f
∗
εB (b),b) −
cost(f∗(b),b), where cost(f∗εB (b),b) can be computed using Lemma 3.
7.2 Single-bid Discounts
Single-bid discounts can potentially lead to savings just as bid-independent dis-
counts. Indeed, for the optimal algorithm, note that for any bi ∈ (0, `) we cannot
define a b−i for which agent i has cost 0. In particular, this means that the dis-
count for player i (hi(bi) = infb−i bi(f(b))) is min{bi, ` − bi}. If bi is on the left
(right) of `/2 then the worst b−i we can define has all the agents located at 0
(`). This in particular means that there are instances that can be implemented for
free (all agents on `/2) and instances for which we need the optimal social cost as
budget (bi ∈ {0, `} for all i).
8 Conclusions
We study budget-feasible mechanisms with monitoring for utilitarian cost-minimi-
zation problems. Our results suggest the amount of financial resources a designer
needs to acquire when facing these kinds of problems. We show that the social
cost is a sufficient and, in many cases, necessary budget to implement incentive-
compatible mechanisms. We also study a case wherein the social cost is not neces-
sary to enforce truthfulness, and more frugal mechanisms are possible, thus allow-
ing a certain degree of freedom in terms of resources accumulation (paid for with
a loss in approximation guarantee). In such a case, plots like the one in Figure 1
can be rather informative for decision makers facing budgeting issues. Our results
can also be read in terms of frugality: while the overpayment implied by truthful-
ness is linear in the cost of the second-best solution, we do prove that there is no
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overpayment at all when monitoring can be implemented. In particular, we find
the necessity (in many cases) of having a budget C to implement a solution of cost
C to be an element that introduces some fairness in the dichotomy between the
designer and the agents, as there is no side with an advantage. This is in sharp
contrast with classical mechanisms wherein agents have the upper hand over the
designer.
Our research agenda is very much linked to the concept of extremal transfers
studied in the literature on truthful mechanisms [31], i.e., the payments that charge
the maximum/minimum amount to the agents. We here care only about the min-
imum and show that for a number of problems/algorithms the extremal transfers
cannot be lower than the social cost. Clearly, our results are a first attempt at
characterizing extremal transfers for incentive compatibility with monitoring and
show an alternative technique to the graph-theoretic reasoning used for classical
truthfulness.
There remain many open questions to address in future research efforts. Firstly,
it would be interesting to study other problems (e.g., machine scheduling) where
our results can have interesting applications. It would also be important to know
what payment functions, other than discounts of first prices, exist and possibly
characterize them. As discussed above, this would restrict the class of algorithms
that can be used in truthful mechanisms, thus raising the question of establish-
ing a trade-off between incentive-compatible allocation rules and corresponding
payment functions. More generally, our research suggests that even though the
vast majority of the mechanism design literature focuses more on the allocation
rules, and less on the payments, there are many unanswered questions about the
computation of truthful payments and the ability to find the “best” payments for
a given algorithm/problem.
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